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The Dutiful Conscript:
An Originalist View of Justice
Wilson’s Conception of Charter
Rights and Their Limits
Adam M. Dodek*

I. INTRODUCTION
Few judges have attracted as much attention as Justice Bertha
Wilson, whose tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada coincided with
the Charter’s first nine years (1982-1991).1 Justice Wilson was
considered the Court’s most liberal member and the justice who
consistently exercised the powers of judicial review more rigorously
than any other justice.2 In so doing, she became a lightning rod for
criticism as well as a beacon for praise and hope. She has been called the
Charter’s “most fervent enforcer on the Court”3 and she has also been
accused of the most egregious violations of judicial impartiality.4 While
*

Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. Thank you to Jonathan
Bricker and Laura Johnson for providing invaluable research assistance and to Jamie Cameron for
making her research materials on Justice Wilson available to me. Thank you to Robin Elliot, Dwight
Newman and Jamie Cameron for reading earlier drafts of this paper and providing helpful
comments.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. While the Charter
came into effect on April 12, 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada did not hear and decide its first
Charter case until 1984. See Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] S.C.J. No. 18,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.).
2
See David M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of
Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), at 59.
3
See Andrée Lajoie & Henry Quillinan, “The Supreme Court Judges’ Views of the Role
of the Courts in the Application of the Charter” in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds.,
Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political, Legal and
Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 93, at 95.
4
See Robert E. Hawkins & Robert I. Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”
(1995) 45 McGill L.J. 1, at 49-56 (Part IV: Judicial Integrity) [hereinafter “‘Democracy, Judging
and Bertha Wilson’”] and Robert I. Martin, The Most Dangerous Branch: How the Supreme Court
of Canada Has Undermined Our Law and Our Democracy (Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2003), at 83.
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she was routinely branded as “judicial activist”, such labels serve only to
caricature Justice Wilson’s jurisprudence rather than to illuminate it.
During her relatively short time on the Supreme Court, Justice Wilson
constructed an independent and distinct approach to the relationship
between rights and their limits under the Charter, mostly through her
statements regarding section 1 and her application of the Oakes test5 and
its larger framework.
Perhaps without much exaggeration, section 1 has been called “the
single most important provision” in the Charter because it requires
courts to “confront the legitimacy and scope of their mandate under the
Charter to strike down or alter the laws of Parliament and the
legislature”.6 Through her judgments and her speeches, Justice Wilson
articulated a confident and coherent approach to section 1 and the new
role of the judiciary under the Charter. In an article that she authored
almost a decade after she stepped down from the nation’s highest court,
Justice Wilson expressed frustration with the continued questioning of
the legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter. In the appropriately
titled “We Didn’t Volunteer”, Justice Wilson argued that the people’s
duly elected representatives conferred upon the courts not just the right
but the duty to frustrate the will of the majority through the process of
judicial review. She expressed difficulty reconciling a policy of judicial
deference with “a duty of judicial review designed to protect the
entrenched rights of citizens”.7 “We Didn’t Volunteer” reveals Justice
Wilson’s conception of the judicial role under the Charter which
manifested itself in her approach to section 1.
To Justice Wilson, judicial review was a duty imposed on the courts
by the Charter through a deliberate and high-profile democratic process.8
Her conception of the judicial role under the Charter draws its
sustenance from a strong historical claim about both the purpose and the
process of rights entrenchment under the Charter. Justice Wilson’s
vision of the relationship between rights and their limits under the
5

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
John A. Terry, “Section 1: Controlling the Oakes Analysis” in Patrick J. Monahan,
Eleanor A. Cronk & Neil Finkelstein, eds., Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2001:
Constitutional and Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) 479, at 479.
7
Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 9.
8
Id.; and Bertha Wilson, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1985) 50 Sask. L. Rev.
169, at 173 (terming the judicial role in interpreting the Charter a “tremendous responsibility”). See
also Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, at 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”] (describing the Charter as a “new and
onerous responsibility” entrusted to the courts).
6
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Charter is an originalist one — one that is based on the assertion that the
legitimacy of the judicial interpretive role finds its source in the events
of 1980-1982 when the Charter was enacted. To characterize Justice
Wilson, who is widely considered as one of the architects of contextual
interpretation,9 as an originalist may appear contradictory if not puzzling
to some. However, as I demonstrate in this article, her conception of the
appropriate relationship between rights and limits under the Charter
should be considered originalist, properly understood.
This article has three parts in addition to this introduction. In Part II,
I analyze Justice Wilson’s conception of rights and limits under the
Charter and demonstrate how it is anchored in a normative vision of the
events of 1980-1982. I explain what I mean by “originalism” and how
Justice Wilson’s constitutional vision fits this description. Part III
demonstrates how this originalist conception of the Charter permeated
Justice Wilson’s model of the relationship between rights and their
limits, mostly, but not exclusively, through her section 1 jurisprudence.
In this part, I distinguish between the multiple meanings of Oakes — the
case, the framework and the test — and show how Justice Wilson
focused on the much stricter Oakes framework while her colleagues
were relaxing the Oakes test. This part further shows how Justice
Wilson’s fidelity to the strictness of the Oakes framework translated into
her staunch insistence on section 1 as the sole source of limits on rights,
her fixation on onus and evidence and her understanding of the
relationship between section 1 and other sections of the Charter. Finally,
this article ends in Part IV with a brief conclusion on the themes of
constitutional duty and destiny.

II. MODERATE ORIGINALISM AND JUSTICE WILSON’S CHARTER
1. Understanding Originalism in Canada
Originalism is a dirty word in Canadian constitutional law. It finds
few defenders in the academy and even fewer (if any) on the bench.
Justice Wilson would have surely strongly resisted any attempt to
characterize her as an originalist.10 So how can I make the claim that her
9
See Shalin M. Sugunasiri, “Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New Standard of
Judicial Analysis and Accountability” (1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 126.
10
Cf. Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judicature 334, at 336-37
[hereinafter “‘The Making of a Constitution’”] (acknowledging criticisms of framers’ intent and
impliedly endorsing such criticisms).
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view of the relationship between rights and their limits was based on an
originalist conception of the Charter? It begins with the assertion of the
failure to properly comprehend the term “originalism” and the inability
to imagine the application of the doctrine in the Canadian context.
Properly understood, originalism represents a valid but neglected
constitutional vision and accurately describes Justice Wilson’s conception
of rights and limits under the Charter. By “originalism”, I mean to
include theories of interpretation that give some weight to various
aspects of the historical dynamics involved in the making of the Charter.
As I explain below, this is a broad definition that encompasses a
spectrum of possible resort to historical sources in constitutional
interpretation. Justice Wilson’s originalism is a moderate variant of
originalism.
Originalism is either ignored or denigrated in Canada. While
American scholars have developed a rich and sometimes nuanced
originalist scholarship,11 in Canada academic examination of the subject
is sparse.12 Moreover, in Canada there is a tendency to simply equate
originalism with “framers’ intent” — the strand of originalism which
holds that the subjective intentions of the framers of the Constitution
should be the authoritative normative source for the interpretation of its
substantive provisions. This is further equated with the widely
discredited “frozen rights theory” under the Canadian Bill of Rights.13
Under this dominant interpretative theory of the bill, the rights protected
by the Canadian Bill of Rights were only those that were in existence at
the time that the bill was enacted, i.e., 1960. This led critics to label it
“the frozen rights theory” and helped fuel the push for a constitutional
bill of rights which would both consist of and be capable of growth
11
For a recent intellectual and political history of originalism in the United States, see
Jonathan O’Neil, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History (Baltimore &
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
12
For the few articles that touch on originalism, see Peter W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights
and American Theories of Interpretation” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87; F.L. Morton & Rainer
Knopff, “Permanence and Change in a Written Constitution: The ‘Living Tree’ Doctrine and the
Charter of Rights” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. (2d) 533; Robin Elliot, “The Charter Revolution and the Court
Party: Sound Critical Analysis or Blinkered Political Polemic?” (2002) 35 U.B.C. L. Rev. 271; M.
Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the
Canadian Charter” (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 183; Grant Huscroft, “A Constitutional ‘Work in Progress’?
The Charter and the Limits of Progressive Interpretation” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 413; Justice Ian
Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345; and Sujit
Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) International Journal
of Constitutional Law 1, at 16-27 (reviewing the legislative drafting around s. 7).
13
S.C. 1960, c. 44.
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beyond the rights frozen in the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights. Framers’
intent was associated with the frozen rights theory because it too focuses
on the particular meaning ascribed to specific rights at their point of
enactment. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the frozen rights
theory for the interpretation of the Charter.14
Justice Wilson explicitly disavowed framers’ intent and embraced a
purposive approach to constitutional interpretation consistent with the
living tree doctrine which sees the Constitution as “capable of growth
and expansion within its natural limits”.15 The curt dismissal by Justice
Lamer (as he then was) of the intent of the framers in the Motor Vehicle
Reference16 together with the talismanic invocation of the living tree
doctrine has effectively silenced any discussion of originalism in Canada
since 1985. Since the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Supreme Court has
continued to make reference to the intent of the framers, but such
references have been episodic, inconsistent and unpredictable.17 Justice
Lamer’s dismissal of framers’ intent in Motor Vehicle Reference
occurred at the same time as a heated and vibrant debate on originalism
was being launched in the United States.18 So while the debate on
14

See Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, supra, note 1, at 365-66; Singh v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at
209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]; R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
295, at 342-44 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1326-27
(S.C.C.). See Tanya Lee, “Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep” (2008) 41
S.C.L.R. (2d) 263 (for discussion of casting off the constraint of the Bill of Rights in interpreting the
Charter).
15
See “The Making of a Constitution”, supra, note 10, at 336-38, citing Edwards v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124, and 126 (J.C.P.C.), per Lord
Sankey.
16
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 8.
17
See, e.g., New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999]
S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 106 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994]
3 S.C.R. 236, at para. 30 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, at para.
107 (S.C.C.); Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 327, at para. 107 (S.C.C.); McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 229, at 340-41 (S.C.C.); United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] S.C.J. No. 56, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 1469, at 1479-80 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at
143-44 (S.C.C.); Reference re Bill 30, an Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.J. No.
44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, at 1163 (S.C.C.); and Reference re Public Service Employment Relations
Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No.10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 412-13 (S.C.C.).
18
The time during which the Motor Vehicle Reference was under reserve coincided with
the rise of originalism as both a political issue and a constitutional theory of interpretation through
notable speeches by President Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Judge
Robert Bork, and a public response by Justice William Brennan. See generally Steven G. Calabresi,
“A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate” in Steven G. Calabresi, ed., Originalism: A
Quarter-Century of Debate (Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007) 1, at 1-17. For the text of
the referenced speeches see Calabresi, Originalism: A Quarter Century of Debate, id., at 47 et seq.
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originalism was opening up and heating up in the United States, it was
being closed down and quieted in Canada. As a result, Canadians have
failed or refused to explore the possibilities of originalism in a Canadian
context.19
Originalism and framers’ intent are not coterminous; the latter is but
one subset of the former. In its strictest form, originalism professes “the
binding authority of the text of the Constitution or the intention of its
adopters”.20 However, commentators often distinguish between stricter
and looser or more moderate forms of originalism. The loose form views
originalism as an informed point of departure for a contemporary
decision, whereas the strict form insists that the original meaning should

(Speech by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985),
55 et seq. (Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., at Georgetown University, October 12, 1985),
83 et seq. (Speech by Judge Robert H. Bork at the University of San Diego Law School, November
18, 1985). The nomination of Judge Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court ignited a public and academic
debate over originalism. See, e.g., Jonathan O’Neil, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A
Constitutional History, supra, note 11, at 161-89 (chapter on Robert Bork and the Trial of
Originalism).
19
This is not the place for a full analysis of the contextual differences between concerns
about framers’ intent in the United States and Canada. However, several critical distinctions may be
notable. First, framers’ intent is often criticized on the normative grounds that the American polity
should not be ruled by the intentions of a long-dead class of men. Given the recentness of the
enactment of the Charter, Canadian jurists cannot simply dismiss framers’ intent on this basis.
Moreover, the recentness of the Charter supports framers’ intent in Canada and a normative
argument must be presented as to why the intent of the framers should be ignored in Canada.
Second, framers’ intent is often criticized in the United States on empirical grounds, for the lack of
authoritative records of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia which produced the
Constitution. No such problem exists in Canada as we are awash in official and unofficial records of
the various conferences, the proceedings before the Joint Committee, debates in Parliament and
provincial legislatures, etc. See also Lorraine E. Weinrib, “Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm
Lost?” (2002) 6 Review of Constitutional Studies 119, at 156 n. 95 (listing additional factors)
[hereinafter “‘Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?’”]. Tanya Lee has articulated an
interesting explanation for the Supreme Court of Canada’s disregard for framers’ intent. She states
that it “likely sprang from a prosaic cause”. According to Lee,
[w]hen the Americans speak of framers’ intent, they speak of those who drafted the
American Bill of Rights, of revolutionary heroes, of Madison and Jefferson. In contrast, the
Charter was the product of its age, of its champions, such as Prime Minister Trudeau, but
also of public participation . . ., and political brinkmanship. Unlike the American founding
fathers, the framers of the Charter were alive and kicking and available for comment.
However, if they had been called as witnesses, the Supreme Court likely would have seen
these individuals, despite their outstanding contributions, as contemporary practitioners of
the rough art of politics, not as golden historical figures. Perfection is more easily perceived
from afar.
Tanya Lee, “Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 263.
20
Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding” (1980) 60 Boston
U. L. Rev. 204, at 204 [hereinafter “‘The Misconceived Quest’”].

(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE DUTIFUL CONSCRIPT

337

prevail.21 Originalism can operate on a very specific level, examining the
meaning of specific constitutional terms, or it can function on a higher
level of generality. Justice Wilson’s originalism is of this moderate
variant, which focuses on the original understanding of the Charter at a
higher level of abstraction.
There are various forms of originalism. The terms “original
meaning”, “original intention” and “original understanding” are often
used interchangeably in an imprecise manner. However, as explained by
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Jack Rakove, they each have distinct
meanings. Original meaning refers to the attempt to recover the literal
wording — the language — of the many provisions of the Constitution.
Original intent refers to those actors whose decisions produced the
constitutional language whose meaning is at issue, i.e., the framers.
Original understanding is a broader term which covers the impressions
and interpretations of the Constitution formed by its original readers —
the citizens, polemicists and convention delegates who participated one
way or another in ratification.22 On a strict view of originalism, the
specific meaning, intent or understanding should be authoritative
because it provides the best democratic licence for judicial review under
a written constitution. On a more moderate view, such originalist
conceptions are entitled to some weight in constitutional interpretation
but are not authoritative.
As critics of strict originalism have pointed out, framers’ intent has
two components. Framers’ substantive intent consists of the views of the
framers regarding the meaning of particular constitutional provisions
that they enacted. Their interpretive intent refers to how those
substantive understandings are interpreted and applied by the courts.23
There is no necessary connection between substantive intent originalism
and interpretative intent originalism. The framers of a constitution may
have very specific views regarding the content of particular constitutional
provisions but not intend that those views be authoritative and
conclusive for purposes of constitutional interpretation.24 This point is
21

See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), at 9 [hereinafter “Original Meanings”]. On Brest’s
different forms of originalism, see id., at 204-205.
22
Original Meanings, id., at 7-8.
23
See Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 77 [hereinafter “Politics and the
Constitution”], citing “The Misconceived Quest”, supra, note 20, at 205-16. See also H. Powell,
“The Original Understanding of Original Intent” (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885.
24
See “The Misconceived Quest”, id., cited by Politics and the Constitution, id.
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critical for differentiating between originalism in the United States and
Canada because we are much closer in time to the original events.
Patrick Monahan’s conclusion regarding the record of the view of the
drafters is that they did not intend that their substantive views on the
content of particular provisions of the Charter would be determinative of
their constitutional meaning. Instead, Monahan contends that the
interpretive intent of the framers can be described in terms of a
“modified judicial realism” based on their analysis of how constitutional
interpretation had developed in the United States.25 In the Canadian
context, progressive interpretation in the form of “the living tree
doctrine” is consistent with the interpretative intent of the framers.26 The
clear intention of those who framed the Charter was that the courts break
from the frozen rights theory that had marginalized the Bill of Rights.
Justice Wilson’s constitutional vision was originalist in this sense of
professing fidelity to this interpretive intent of the framers. It is therefore
not at odds to claim Justice Wilson as an originalist at the same time as
she was a proponent of purposive and contextual interpretation.
Justice Wilson’s originalism is of the moderate variant. It does not
require that judges be bound by the specific meaning of the document
for those who gave it legal authority, but rather that they should be
guided by the original understanding of the Charter at a higher level of
abstraction. By this I mean “the motives, expectations, fears, and
aspirations that surrounded the enactment of the document in 1982”.27
This includes both the written record and the general context
surrounding the enactment of the Charter. The written record includes
the explicit discussion of the Charter found in the proceedings before
Parliament, provincial legislatures and at the various federal-provincial
meetings.28 The context includes the surrounding assumptions and
concerns that informed the manner in which the framers and ratifiers
thought about the issues in the Charter.29 Thus, the American
Constitution can only be properly understood in contrast to the failure of
25

Politics and the Constitution, id., at 78.
See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2007+) at 60.1(f) [hereinafter “Constitutional Law”] and Politics and the Constitution, id.,
at 78-82.
27
Patrick J. Monahan, “The Charter Then and Now”, in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis &
John Russell, eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s
Political, Legal and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 105, at 106
[hereinafter “‘The Charter Then and Now’”].
28
Cf. Original Meanings, supra, note 21, at 12.
29
Id.
26
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the Articles of Confederation.30 Similarly, the Charter can only be
comprehended in contradistinction to the experience under the Canadian
Bill of Rights where “[j]udicial intransigence to that statutory instrument,
in the purported service of legislative sovereignty, paved the way for the
constitutional entrenchment of rights.”31 These elements are part of the
context of an originalist conception of the Charter that explains Justice
Wilson’s jurisprudence on the relationship between rights and their
limits under the Charter.
This constitutional context forms the foundation for Justice Wilson’s
originalist conception of the Charter. It is based on a particular
interpretation of the historical events surrounding the enactment of the
Charter which is contested. Critics of judicial review in the Canadian
context draw heavily on American arguments for judicial restraint and
against judicial review. However, the more that they do so, the weaker
their protestations against judicial review under the Charter become. There
are several critical distinctions between judicial review in the United
States and Canada which limit the transfer north of anti-judicial review
arguments from south of the border. First, the American Constitution is
silent on judicial review whereas the Canadian Constitution explicitly
sanctions it.32 Second, the Charter was enacted against the backdrop of the
debate over the legitimacy of judicial review and judicial power in
the United States and the liberal decisions of the Warren Court. Third,
the Charter contains a legislative override of judicial review whereas the
American Constitution does not. For these and other reasons, interpretations of the events of 1982 which seek to preserve parliamentary
sovereignty and tether the power of judicial review are problematic.
Justice Wilson’s originalist conception of the Charter is based on a more
solid foundation. Her constitutional vision contains a democratic conception of originalism that goes beyond the Charter’s drafters and the

30

Cf. Original Meanings, id., at 17 (stating that “[t]he only understanding we can be
entirely confident that the majority of the ratifiers shared was that they were indeed deciding
whether the Constitution would ‘form a more perfect union’ than the Articles of Confederation”).
31
Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter”
(1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 471 [hereinafter “Section One and the Charter”].
32
See s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (providing that “[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect”).
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framers to include the participants in the public debate between 1980 and
1982.33
2. Justice Wilson’s Vision of the Charter
Justice Wilson’s view of the relationship between rights and their
limits flows directly from her larger vision of the Charter, which is
rooted in the twin concepts of liberalism and democracy. While Justice
Wilson’s fidelity to a liberal vision of rights is widely accepted, the
proposition that her vision of the Charter is a democratic one is
strenuously contested.34 Both elements are originalist in the sense of
being grounded in assertions regarding the context for the Charter’s
enactment. On liberalism, she explained her view in a memorandum to
Chief Justice Dickson in one case: “I tend to see the Charter as an antimajoritarian document and the role of the Court to ensure that minorities
are not sacrificed to the majority will.”35 Her liberalism emphasized
personal autonomy, revealed in her explanation that “[the Charter tells]
us that there will be rights. These rights erect around each individual an
invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The
role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of these

33

Whether Justice Wilson’s originalist conception is correct as a question of history is a
matter that must be left for another day, given the subsequent academic neglect of the events of
1980-1982. Robert Hawkins and Robert Martin argued strongly that Justice Wilson’s expansive
view of the role of the courts under the Charter contradicts the view of the framers. See
“Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”, supra, note 4, at 29-33. The authors take a more narrow
view of originalism than I do in this article, considering only the views of the politicians and
government officials who were involved in the drafting of the Charter and excluding the views and
the participation of the Canadians who appeared before the Joint Committee. The authors also fail to
consider the significance of the changes that occurred to the text of s. 1. In fact, they consider the
original federal draft of August 22, 1980 to be “more or less [s. 1’s] current form”. Id., at 31. This is
a significant oversight which undercuts their argument. Further, Justice Wilson’s originalist view of
the Charter is supported by Peter Hogg, who states that “in the case of Canada’s Charter of Rights, I
think it is clear as a matter of fact that the original understanding of many of the framers of 1982
was not that the Charter rights should be frozen in the shape that seemed good in 1982 but rather
that the rights should be subject to changing judicial interpretations over time.” Constitutional Law,
supra, note 26, at 36.8(a). See also Politics and the Constitution, supra, note 23, at 78. To the extent
that I cite sources that confirm Justice Wilson’s assumptions or assertions, it is to show that her
views have some support, not that they are necessarily correct as a matter of historical
interpretatation.
34
See, e.g., “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”, supra, note 4.
35
Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2003), at 409. The case was R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No.
131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
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fences.”36 This understanding of the purpose of the Charter, which
privileges personal autonomy, is contestable and Justice Wilson has been
criticized for failing to recognize and account for collectivist elements in
the Charter.37
The democratic component of Justice Wilson’s vision is more
complicated and more disputed since her judgments have often been
labelled “anti-democratic”.38 If one conceives of democracy as simply
majoritarian rule and a democratic vision of the judicial role as deference
to the expression of majoritarian preferences through the legislative
process, then claiming Justice Wilson as a democrat is a lost cause.
However, judicial deference to the will of the majority does not accord
with the constitutional project, either. As is generally recognized, there is
a tension between majoritarian democracy and the constitutionalization
of rights.39 Justice Wilson’s democratic vision of the Charter may itself
appear paradoxical but I attempt to explain it below.
Justice Wilson saw the enactment of the Charter as a national
political choice. In her view, Canada’s democratically elected Parliament
had entrusted the courts with a mission — to uphold the Charter — and
the courts had a duty to fulfil that mission. She saw the Charter as a
transformative enterprise in the sense of its potential impact both on the
institutions of government (the legislature, the executive and the courts)
and on the lives of ordinary Canadians.40 To Justice Wilson, the
legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter was a settled question. In
her mind, the traditional argument against the legitimacy of judicial
review based on the unrepresentative character of the judiciary was
conclusively settled by the enactment of the Charter. In her words, the
36
Wilson, supra, note 10, at 338. Justice Wilson later incorporated these words almost
verbatim into her opinion in R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 17, at 164.
37
See Robin M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — The Erosion of
the Common Front” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 277, at 281. To the extent that her emphasis on personal
autonomy clashed with the collectivist goals of s. 15, this tension has not been adequately reconciled
by Justice Wilson and is beyond the scope of this article. See also McKinney v. University of
Guelph, supra, note 17, at 356 (per Wilson J.) (stating that in Canada, freedom is not co-extensive
with the absence of government; rather, freedom has often required the intervention and protection of
government against private action).
38
See “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”, supra, note 4, especially at 57-58.
39
See generally Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: The Paradox of
Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), at xii-xiii [hereinafter
“Judicial Power and the Charter”] (explaining the tension between energetic self-government and
individual liberty).
40
That the Charter was intended to have transformative effects is again supported by the
history of the making of the Charter, most notably by the inclusion of a three-year waiting period
before s. 15 of the Charter was to come into effect.
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government “bit the bullet, so to speak, in 1982 when it gave the courts
the power to review legislation to make sure it complied with the
constitution”.41 In less colloquial terms, she adopted the words of Justice
Lamer (as he then was) in the Motor Vehicle Reference:
. . . It ought not to be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the
Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the courts but by the
elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those
representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication
and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility.
Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any
lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.42

According to this view, the critics of judicial review took an
ahistorical if not dehistorical view, neglecting the historical context for
the Charter: the failure of the Bill of Rights, the hearings before the Joint
Committee, the changes to section 1, the strengthening of the equality
guarantee, etc. By the time she had stepped down from the Court, Justice
Wilson was more blunt in expressing her position, stating that the time
had come “to give the lie to some political commentators who still
maintain that the advent of the Charter was a colossal ‘power grab’ by
the courts”.43 She made the democratic claim that “Canadians decided to
charge the courts with the onerous responsibility for reviewing
legislative and executive action for compliance with the constitution”
through a “widely accepted constitutional process”.44 All of this was
done with “full knowledge of the American experience” and of the
criticism of the power of the courts and the debate over judicial review.45
This view finds support in leading members of the academy46 and was
taken as an article of faith by Justice Wilson.
41
Bertha Wilson, “Human Rights and the Courts” (Seminar on the Functioning of
Government: The Canadian Experience, Ottawa, May 30, 1991), in Speeches Delivered by the
Honourable Bertha Wilson 1976-1991 (Ottawa: Supreme Court of Canada, 1992), 742, at 744
[hereinafter “Speeches”]. Professor Hogg notes that “[t]he courts have assumed that the
constitutional status of the Charter resolves their former uncertainty as to the legitimacy of judicial
review” under the Bill of Rights. Constitutional Law, supra, note 26, at 35.5.
42
Motor Vehicle Reference, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.),
quoted by Bertha Wilson, “Law and Policy in a Court of Last Resort” in Frank E. McArdle, ed., The
Cambridge Lectures (Montreal: Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, 1990) 219, at 223.
43
Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 9.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation”
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87, at 88; “Section One and the Charter”, supra, note 31.
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Justice Wilson’s vision accounts for and credits the role of the many
Canadians who appeared before the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution (“Joint
Committee”) in the fall of 1980 through the winter of 1981. It is
contrasted with a more cynical view which dismisses the Joint
Committee as the political handiwork of the federal government
designed to strengthen its hand against the recalcitrant provinces.47
Justice Wilson’s vision of the Charter implicitly recognizes and values
the multiplicity of voices that contributed to the enactment (or “the
framing”) of the Charter. Whatever the government’s intention in
establishing the Joint Committee, it is clear that the parliamentary
hearings took on a dynamic of their own. As described in one of the
popular contemporary accounts of those events:
In the fall of 1980, in a chandeliered ballroom in Parliament’s West
Block, the Liberal government lost control of its constitutional
strategy. The centerpiece — the candy-coloured charter of rights and
freedoms that was to be the prize in Trudeau’s reform package — was
wrenched from the cool hands of the government planners, and taken
over by ordinary Canadians and parliamentary backbenchers.48

The participation of many Canadians before the Joint Committee led
to critical changes to the text of several provisions of the Charter,
including the limitations clause. Justice Wilson’s conception of the
relationship between rights and limits can only be appreciated against
this background.
The strictness of Justice Wilson’s approach to section 1 can be
directly tied to the proceedings and the product of the Joint Committee
process. In the proceedings before the Joint Committee, the limitations
clause became the focus of much attack; it was the most criticized
section of the Charter.49 As detailed by key participants in the
constitutional debates of those years, the original limitations clause from
the federal government’s August 1980 draft of the Charter was clearly
“designed to encourage judicial deference to legislative choices even

47

For examples of this view see, e.g., Judicial Power and the Charter, supra, note 39, at xiv.
Robert Sheppard & Michael Valpy, The National Deal (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982), at
135 [hereinafter “The National Deal”]. But see Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution
1979-1982: Patriation and the Charter of Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), at 57
[hereinafter “Canada and the Constitution”] (asserting that the testimony before the Joint
Committee had little impact).
49
The National Deal, id., at 149.
48
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though they affected civil liberties”.50 Such a limitations clause appealed
to those who opposed the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter as,
in some ways, superior even to a notwithstanding clause.51 The text of
the limitations clause that was referred to the Joint Committee in
October 1980 provided:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits as are
generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a
parliamentary system of government.52

This text was viewed as a further concession to the interests of the
provinces “in building into the charter as large an element of judicial
deference to legislative choices as possible”.53 This was the first public
draft of the Charter and of section 1 and “[w]omen’s groups, civil
liberties organizations, ethnic and racial minorities, the disabled
community, and even Canada’s human rights commissioner all urged the
federal government to go back to the drawing-board and produce a
Charter that would have real teeth”.54
The result of their successful campaign produced changes to the
Charter, including the limitations clause, which was redrafted to include
the text that is now enshrined in section 1.55 Notably, the phrases
“prescribed by law” and “demonstrably justified” were added and the
reference to “a parliamentary system of government” was dropped. The
phrase “demonstrably justified” reflected the concerns of witnesses
before the Joint Committee that the burden of proof of limiting rights

50

Roy Romanow, John Whyte & Howard Leeson, Canada . . . Notwithstanding: The
Making of the Constitution 1976-1982 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), at 243 [hereinafter
“Canada … Notwithstanding”].
51
Id.
52
Draft of October 1980, reproduced as “Appendix A (Proposed Resolution — First
Draft)” in McWhinney, supra, note 48, at 142. Appendix A is also contained in Anne F. Bayefsky,
Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. II (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1989) 743, at 745-46 [hereinafter “Canada’s Constitution Act 1982”].
53
Canada … Notwithstanding, supra, note 50, at 245.
54
“The Charter Then and Now”, supra, note 27, at 109.
55
See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at
650 (noting that the change to s. 1 tended to narrow the focus of the limitation clause and by indirect
means to broaden the rights guarantees); Joseph E. Magnet, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1983), at 663 (noting that the original draft of s. 1 was unacceptable and was redrafted);
and Timothy J. Christian, “The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms” (1982) (Charter Edition) U.B.C. L. Rev. 105, at 107 [hereinafter “‘The
Limitation of Liberty’”].
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should properly rest on the government.56 Thus, when then-Minister of
Justice Jean Chrétien returned before the Committee in his “we have
listened and we have heard you” testimony on January 12, 1981 in which
he tabled an amended version of the Charter with the Committee,
Chrétien declared:
You have been told over and over again that Canadians want a strong
Charter . . . You have been told by many witnesses that Canadians are
not satisfied with the type of compromise which weakens the
effectiveness of constitutional protection of human rights and
freedoms. I accept the legitimacy of that criticism.57

Chrétien claimed that the proposed new wording for section 1 was
even more stringent than that suggested by some of the leading critics
who appeared as witnesses before the Joint Committee.58 The
explanatory notes to the new, more robust section 1 stated:
The proposed amendment would narrow the limits that could be placed
on the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. For a right to be
limited, the limitation would be required to be prescribed by law and to
be both reasonable and capable of being demonstrably justified.59

In the words of some of the leading participants in the events of
1980-1982 who would clearly be considered framers, “[i]f these changes
to section 1 were applied literally, claims by governments that their
limitation on individual rights were reasonable would face a tough
test.”60
In addition, the inclusion of the notwithstanding clause played an
important role in Justice Wilson’s democratic vision, although it
operated mostly in the background of her constitutional mindset. Writing
in 1988 while still on the Court, Justice Wilson hedged her position on
the notwithstanding clause, stating that it would be hard to predict the
impact of section 33 on Charter interpretation:

56

The National Deal, supra, note 48, at 149-50.
Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on
the Constitution, January 12, 1981, 36:10 (Testimony of Minister of Justice Jean Chrétien).
58
Id., at 36:11.
59
See Explanatory Notes to January 12, 1981 draft of the Charter, contained in Robin
Elliot, “Interpreting the Charter — Use of Earlier Versions as an Aid” (1982) (Charter Edition)
U.B.C. L. Rev. 11, at 24. For side-by-side comparison of the two versions of s. 1, see Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982, supra, note 52, at 766.
60
Canada … Notwithstanding, supra, note 50, at 251.
57
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Perhaps Canada’s courts will be more venturesome in finding that
inviolable human rights exist, secure in the knowledge that their word
is less final than their United States’ counterparts. Perhaps they will be
less venturesome, feeling that their authority as a Court will be eroded
by frequent governmental resort to the notwithstanding clause.61

A decade later, after she had retired from the Court, Justice Wilson
was less restrained in her comments. In “We Didn’t Volunteer”, she
articulated a robust role for the courts, grounded in the legitimacy of the
democratic process that produced the Charter. Section 33 fit into this
scheme by providing a mechanism for preserving parliamentary
sovereignty if and when governments have the political will to use it.62
In the formative years of the Charter which coincided with Justice
Wilson’s tenure on the Court, the existence of the notwithstanding
mechanism loomed large in constitutional thinking. After it was invoked
by the Quebec government following the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in December 1988 in the Ford case,63 the notwithstanding
clause quickly became politically illegitimate outside of Quebec.64
However, the notwithstanding clause was part of the mix that
contributed to Justice Wilson’s constitutional thinking while she
developed and articulated her thoughts about the relationship between
rights and their limits under the Charter.
The drafting process was “a battleground” between pro and antiCharter forces and the Joint Committee process produced significant
changes to strengthen section 1.65 It was widely recognized, even by its
critics, that the Charter would profoundly alter the existing relationship
between courts and legislatures and notably alter the role of the Supreme
Court.66 The efforts at the Joint Committee and afterwards to strengthen
the Charter in 1980-1982 were important in sending a message to the
61

Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (April-May, 1988) 71:6 Judicature 334,

at 336.
62

See Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 11.
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.).
64
Arguably in the 20 years since Ford, id., a convention has developed against the use of
the notwithstanding clause. On the rise and decline of the notwithstanding clause, see Judicial
Power and the Charter, supra, note 39, at 181-88.
65
See Lorraine E. Weinrib, Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost? (2002) 6 Review
of Constitutional Studies 119, at 136, 139.
66
See, e.g., Canada and the Constitution, supra, note 48, at ix (criticizing the federal
government for failing to be more explicit in this respect). See generally Peter W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 652-53 (noting that a major
effect of the Charter would be an expansion of judicial review and that this responsibility would be
“a formidable task” for the courts).
63

(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE DUTIFUL CONSCRIPT

347

judiciary about the nature of the Charter as a rights-protecting document
to be taken seriously.67 Justice Wilson not only heard this message but
she served as its most vocal proponent.

III. CHAMPION OF THE OAKES FRAMEWORK
1. Section 1 as the Battleground for the Charter’s Soul
Section 1 has become the focus of attention for much of the debate
over the appropriate role of the courts under the Charter. It is critical to
Hogg and Bushell’s dialogue theory,68 which has dominated discussions
about constitutional interpretation in Canada since 1997 and succeeded in
capturing the Court’s attention as well.69 The importance of the limitations
clause was recognized during the drafting process before the Joint
Committee and has rightly been called “the pivotal provision in the
Charter”.70 Writing the year after Oakes, Robin Elliot correctly predicted
67
See “The Charter Then and Now”, in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds.,
Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political, Legal and
Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 105, at 119.
68
See Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. Hogg and Bushell updated their theory in 2007. See Peter W. Hogg, Alison
A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much Ado About
Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
69
Hogg and Bushell’s dialogue theory spawned a cottage industry of commentary. See F.L.
Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue?” (1999) 20(3) Policy Options 23; Janet L. Hiebert, “Why Must a
Bill of Rights Be a Contest of Political and Judicial Wills?” (1999) 10 Public Law Review 22;
Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and
Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Thornton, “Reply to ‘Six
Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. To commemorate the 10th anniversary of
the Hogg and Bushell article, the Osgoode Hall Law Journal dedicated a special edition to “Charter
Dialogue: Ten Years Later” led off by Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell & Wade K. Wright,
“Charter Dialogue Revisited — Or “‘Much Ado About Metaphors’”, id. This volume includes
commentaries by Richard Haigh and Michael Sobkin, Christopher Manfredi, Carissima Mathen,
Andrew Petter and Kent Roach, as well as a reply from Hogg, Bushell and Wright. The Supreme
Court of Canada has embraced the concept of dialogue. See, e.g., Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J.
No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at paras. 137-39, 178 (S.C.C.); M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 3, at para. 328 (S.C.C.); Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs),
[1990] S.C.J. No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 116 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at paras. 20, 57, 125 (S.C.C.); Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada
(Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R 1120, at para. 268 (S.C.C.); Bell
ExpressVu v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 65-66 (S.C.C.); Harper v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
70
Robin M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — The Erosion of the
Common Front” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 277, at 279 [hereinafter “‘The Supreme Court and Section
1’”]. See also “Paradigm Lost?”), supra, note 65, at 120 (terming s. 1 the “centerpiece of the new
constitutional arrangement”).
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that section 1 was “likely to become the focal point of debate about the
proper scope of judicial review”.71 In more dramatic terms, one
commentator writing in 1982 prophesized that section 1 was “the tool with
which the fragile freedoms contained in the Charter . . . will be cultivated
or nipped in the bud”.72 Section 1 is a window into the judicial soul. Its
interpretation not only reveals the impact of the Charter on other branches
of government but also tells us “about the Court itself and how it perceives
its role under the Charter”.73 Justice Wilson correctly identified section 1
as the fault line between liberal and conservative approaches to the role of
the courts. She saw the essential question as being “when is it permissible
to sacrifice individual or minority rights in order to achieve what is
perceived by government [i.e., the majority] to be the common good?”74
Justice Wilson clearly saw section 1 as the vehicle for the Court to carry
out its mission under the Charter.
The Supreme Court’s development of the Oakes test and its
subsequent adaptation or relaxation in cases such as Edwards Books75
and Irwin Toy76 are well documented and not repeated here.77 For our
purposes, we are interested in analyzing Justice Wilson’s role in this
process as it sheds light on her view of the relationship between rights
and their limits under the Charter. Her position was clear: she saw other
members of the Court desiring to replace the strict standard of review
under Oakes with a much more deferential standard of “reasonableness”.78
This she was unwilling to do and she was prepared to and did fight it
every step of the way, both on and off the Court.

71
“The Supreme Court and Section 1”, id., at 293. R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
72
“The Limitation of Liberty”, supra, note 55, at 105.
73
“The Supreme Court and Section 1”, supra, note 70, at 279.
74
Bertha Wilson, “Human Rights and the Courts” (Seminar on the Functioning of
Government: the Canadian Experience, Ottawa, May 30, 1991), Speeches, supra, note 41, 742, at
746.
75
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Edwards Books”].
76
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.).
77
See especially “The Supreme Court and Section 1”, supra, note 70; Lorraine E. Weinrib,
“The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” (1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469. See
generally Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007+)
at 38.11(b).
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Bertha Wilson, “Human Rights and the Courts”, Speeches, supra, note 41, 742, at 747.
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2. Mission Instructions: The Oakes Framework and the Oakes Test
Justice Wilson frequently began her limitations analysis by quoting
section 1 in its entirety. She did so even in her last judgments,79 eight
years after the Charter had come into force and the contents of that
section had become well known to jurists and lawyers, and to a new
generation of law students. However, by quoting section 1, Justice
Wilson was emphasizing the entirety of its contents — that the Charter
guaranteed the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.80 By the time of her final year on the Court,
she openly acknowledged the existence of two separate and distinct
limitations analyses. The first was Oakes — the original framework
developed in that case — and the second was a more relaxed limitations
analysis.81 To her, the “original” Oakes test was the default and the
relaxed application was the exception, much like her view of the
relationship between rights and their limits.
Justice Wilson’s originalist understanding manifested itself in her
approach to section 1. She began to articulate her conception of the sharp
delineation between rights and their limits prior to Oakes. Much of
Justice Wilson’s commentary regarding section 1 foreshadowed the
framework set out by the Court in Oakes. In Operation Dismantle, she
stated that “[t]he rights under the Charter not being absolute, their
content or scope must be discerned quite apart from any limitation
sought to be imposed upon them by the government under s. 1.”82 She
developed this point in Singh83 and reiterated it post-Oakes in R. v.
Jones.84
In Singh, Justice Wilson explained that the rights and freedoms set
out in the Charter “are fundamental to the political structure of Canada
and are guaranteed by the Charter as part of the supreme law of our
nation”.85 She then continued, expressing the idea of the courts’ duty
under the Charter, noting that it was “important to remember that the
79

See, e.g., Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] S.C.J. No. 125, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 483, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 700, at para. 34 (S.C.C.).
80
On the duality of s. 1, see “Paradigm Lost?”, supra, note 65.
81
See Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, supra, note 79, at 553.
82
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at 489
(S.C.C.).
83
Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.).
84
[1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at para. 18 (S.C.C.).
85
Singh, supra, note 83, at 218.
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courts are conducting this inquiry in light of a commitment to uphold the
rights and freedoms set out in other sections of the Charter”.86 This
would become a frequent theme in Justice Wilson’s judgments.
Justice Wilson recognized the tension inherent in the limitations
process. Articulating the dilemma of adjudication under section 1, she
stated that if too low a threshold was set, the courts would run the risk of
“emasculating the Charter” while if too high a threshold was set, the
courts would run the risk of “unjustifiably restricting government
action”.87 And in a critical precursor to the analysis in Oakes,88 Justice
Wilson stated that the question was not whether the government action
was reasonable but whether it was reasonable to deprive an individual of
their Charter rights in the particular context.89 Many of the themes of
Singh would make their way into Justice Dickson’s judgment in Oakes.
In discussing Oakes, we need to differentiate between its three
different meanings: (1) the Oakes case; (2) the Oakes framework; and
(3) the Oakes test. The Oakes case is straightforward. It refers to the
Court’s examination of the issue of whether the reverse onus provision
in the Narcotic Control Act concerning possession for purposes of
trafficking offends the presumption of innocence protected by section
11(d) of the Charter. This is the narrowest meaning of Oakes and the
least important jurisprudentially. The most frequent meaning of Oakes is
the Oakes test consisting of the well-known formula for conducting the
limitations analysis under section 1: (1) the objective must be pressing
and substantial in a free and democratic society; (2) the means chosen
must be proportional to the objective, i.e. (a) they must be rationally
connected to the objective; (b) they should impair the right “as little as
possible”; and (c) there must be a proportionality between the effects of
the measures limiting the right and the objective.90 This is only part of
the larger Oakes framework which has generally been overshadowed and
largely overlooked by the Oakes test. The Oakes framework provides the
86

Id., at 218.
Id., at 217.
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Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter”
(1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 483-88.
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Singh, supra, note 83, at para. 218. The issue in Singh was whether it was reasonable to
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system for the adjudication of refugee claims which does not accord with the principles of
fundamental justice. Id.
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guidelines and the context for how the Oakes test should be applied, as
described below. The critical distinction between Justice Wilson and her
colleagues was that they tended to focus on the Oakes test whereas she
focused on the Oakes framework. The gap between Justice Wilson and
the other justices grew as they began to relax elements of the Oakes test
and to ignore the rest of the Oakes framework while she continued to be
faithful to the latter, including insisting on the strict application of the
former. I develop the distinction between the Oakes test and the
framework below.
Oakes was a rare Charter case where Justice Wilson did not write
separately. While joining the majority decision of Dickson C.J.C.,
Wilson J. quickly assumed ownership of Oakes — both the test and the
framework — and became its most ardent defender on the Court. The
Oakes test is set out above. It is important to understand the framework
which surrounded it, as it is often overlooked and because it provides the
basis for Justice Wilson’s limitations analysis during her tenure on the
Court. In Oakes, the introduction to the section 1 test begins by
reproducing the text of section 1 (as Wilson J. often did) and noting the
dual functions of section 1: “first, it constitutionally guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in the provisions which follow; and second, it states
explicitly the exclusive justificatory criteria (outside of s. 33 . . .) against
which limitations on those rights and freedoms must be measured”.91
Then, drawing on Wilson J.’s statement in Singh that “it is important to
remember that the courts are conducting this inquiry in light of a
commitment to uphold the rights and freedoms set out in the other
sections of the Charter”,92 Dickson C.J.C. emphasized that any section 1
inquiry “must be premised on an understanding that the impugned limit
violates constitutional rights and freedoms”.93 After proceeding to review
the criteria of “a free and democratic society”, Dickson C.J.C. concluded
that these criteria “impose a stringent standard of justification, especially
when understood in terms of the two contextual considerations discussed
above, namely, the violation of a constitutionally-guaranteed right or
freedom and the fundamental principles of a free and democratic
society”. Turning next to the question of onus, Dickson C.J.C. stated that
it was clear from the text of section 1 that limits are exceptions and that
the presumption is that “the rights and freedoms are guaranteed unless
91
92
93

R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 135.
Singh, supra, note 83, at 218.
R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 135.
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the party invoking s. 1 can bring itself within the exceptional criteria
which justify [Oakes] their being limited”.94 The primacy of the default
to rights rule was expressed through the Oakes framework.
On the standard of proof, Dickson C.J.C. determined that it was to
be the civil standard of a preponderance of probabilities but that standard
was to be “rigorously” applied.95 Again, he found support for this
conclusion in the use of the phrase “demonstrably justified” in section 1.
On the important question of evidence to meet the constituent elements
of the Oakes test, Dickson C.J.C. noted first that evidence would
generally be required and that it “should be cogent and persuasive and
make clear to the court the consequences of imposing or not imposing
the limit”.96 The Oakes framework is consistent with an originalist
understanding of section 1 and of the Charter. In fact, the framework
was predicted by some of the key framers of the Charter, who stated that
the insertion of the phrase “demonstrably justified” appeared “to impose
a burden on governments to impose actual evidence of the need to limit
rights instead of relying on a more abstract claim that the legislation
under challenge was within a range of acceptable responses to the social
situation”.97 This originalist description accurately describes the Oakes
framework and contrasts Justice Wilson’s steadfast adherence to it with
its abandonment by other members of the Court in favour of a relaxed
application of the Oakes test. Despite such predictions by some framers,
Justice Wilson frequently found herself alone in applying the Oakes
framework.
3. Going It Alone: Applying the Oakes Framework
(a) Section 1 as the Sole Source of Limits
Consistent with her originalist conception and her fidelity to the
Oakes framework, Justice Wilson saw section 1 as the sole source of
limits on Charter rights. Chief Justice Dickson had expressed as much in
Oakes itself.98 To Justice Wilson there were always two important
94

Id., at 137.
Id., at 137.
96
Id., at 138. Chief Justice Dickson did recognize that there might be cases where certain
elements of the s. 1 analysis are obvious or self-evident.
97
See Canada . . . Notwithstanding (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), at 250.
98
R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 135 (noting that s. 1 states explicitly “the exclusive
justificatory criteria (outside of s. 33 … ) against which limitations on those rights and freedoms
must be measured.”).
95
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assumptions operating in the background as she opined on this issue.
The first was her vision of the Charter as set out above — specifically
that rights are the norm and limits the exception. Second, Justice Wilson
viewed section 33 as another legitimate mechanism available to limit
rights. She saw section 1 as the sole source of judicial limits on rights
and section 33 as an available legislative source to limit rights.99 She
developed the position that section 1 is the sole source of limits on rights
in a number of cases.
In the early case of Operation Dismantle,100 Justice Wilson would
not accept the position that certain government activity could be beyond
the reach of the Charter. In rejecting the political questions doctrine, she
refused to place an external limit on the types of issues amenable to
judicial review. In her words, the Court was obliged under the Charter to
examine such issues and if they were determined to violate an
individual’s right to life and liberty under section 7, then the only way to
limit the infringed rights was through section 1.101 Similarly, in Canada
v. Schmidt,102 the Court held that section 11(h) of the Charter did not
have extraterritorial effect and thus did not apply to extradition
proceedings. Justice Wilson disagreed with this, stating that “Charter
rights which are enshrined in our Constitution as part of the supreme law
of Canada must be recognized and given effect in any judicial
proceeding in Canada unless a reasonable limit under s. 1 has been
imposed upon them.”103
99

Justice Wilson’s views on s. 33, generally referred to as “the notwithstanding clause”,
are beyond the scope of this paper. She concurred in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra,
note 63, which dealt with s. 33. It is fair to say that s. 33 remained a real rather than a remote option
during her tenure on the Court when she was developing and applying her view of rights and their
limits. Since Justice Wilson retired from the Court in 1991, no government has used this section to
“limit” or “override” a Charter right and the notwithstanding clause has become politically
illegitimate, so much so that a desperate Prime Minister Paul Martin promised during the 2006
election to enact federal legislation to prohibit its use. See “Martin wraps campaign in constitutional
pledge”, CBC News (January 10, 2006), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/
national/2006/01/09/elxn-debates-look.html>. See also Paul Wells, Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul
Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper’s New Conservatism (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2006), at
220-22.
100
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, supra, note 82.
101
Id., at paras. 64-65. As discussed below in part III.4, later that year in the Motor Vehicle
Reference, Wilson J. adopted the view that a violation of s. 7 could not be saved under s. 1. See
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at
523 (S.C.C.).
102
[1987] S.C.J. No. 24, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.).
103
Id., at 533. See also Argentina (Republic) v. Mellino, [1987] S.C.J. No. 25, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 536, at 561 (S.C.C.) (per Wilson J., concurring) and United States of America v. Allard,
[1987] S.C.J. No. 20, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, at 576 (S.C.C.) (per Wilson J., concurring).
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She did not support reading internal limits or qualifications into the
plain language of enumerated rights because this usurped the role of
section 1 and collapsed the two-stage analysis into a single-stage one.
Thus, in R. v. Strachan,104 a case involving the right to counsel under
section 10(b), the Court interpreted “the right to instruct and retain
counsel without delay” as providing time for police, upon their entry into
a home with knowledge that weapons were located on the premises, to
get “matters under control” before allowing the person arrested to call a
lawyer. In Justice Wilson’s mind, this had the effect of reading a
qualification or limit into section 10(b) which was simply not there; the
Court read “the phrase ‘without delay’ as ‘without unreasonable
delay’”.105 It had taken 40 minutes for the police to get matters under
control. Justice Wilson acknowledged that while this justification might
have been necessary under the particular circumstances of the case, it
was not a norm that the courts were free to substitute for the
constitutional standard of “without delay”. Justice Wilson saw this
implied qualification as a slippery slope and chastised the Court for
removing “all certainty as to the citizen’s rights under section 10(b)” in a
manner that was also “completely inconsistent with its plain words and
purpose”.106
Justice Wilson’s concern with reading in implied limitations was
that the Oakes framework could be rendered inoperative and the end
result would be reduced rights protection. In a passage that reflects her
background assumptions on the relationship between rights and their
limits, Wilson J. stated that “[i]t would be unfortunate indeed if the
exception were to become the rule and one of the fundamental rights of
the citizen was to be so easily gainsaid.”107 To Justice Wilson, section 1
was the sole source of reasonable limits which had to be prescribed by
law and not imposed by the police in their discretion.108
Moreover, reading in qualifiers flew in the face of Justice Wilson’s
original understanding of the Charter. By reading in a “reasonableness”
requirement to the definition of the right, the Court was effectively
returning to the text of section 1 as originally referred to the Joint
Committee prior to its amendment and ultimate enactment. Such a move
104
105
106
107
108

[1988] S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 1010 (per Wilson J., concurring).
Id., at 1011 (per Wilson J., concurring).
Id., at 1013.
See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R 613, at 621 (S.C.C.).
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can be viewed as anti-democratic in a number of ways. It rendered the
work of the Joint Committee respecting section 1 — both of its members
and of the witnesses who appeared before it — a nullity. It implicitly
overrode the amendment brought forth by Minister of Justice Chrétien,
embraced by the Joint Committee and ultimately endorsed by joint
resolution of the House of Commons and the Senate. The effect of
reading in a reasonableness requirement is to ignore the requirement of
“demonstrably justified” and do an end run around the original
understanding of section 1 and arguably of the Charter as well.109
Justice Wilson resisted other attempts to import limiting criteria into
the right-definition stage. For example, in R. v. Turpin,110 she clearly
distinguished between the individual rights protecting nature of the right
to a jury trial under section 11(f) and any collective societal interest in
limiting that right, whose proper place was to be found under section
1.111 She stated that “[t]o prevent an individual from waiving his or her
right to the benefit of a jury trial is clearly to elevate the interests of
society over the interests of the individual. This is normally achieved
through the application of s. 1 and not through reading a limit into the
right itself.”112
Justice Wilson’s comments about the relationship between section 15
and section 1 also reveal the mischief about which she was concerned by
reading in internal qualifiers to enumerated rights. In Andrews,113 McIntyre
J. addressed the relationship between sections 15 and 1. Justice Wilson
agreed with his comments that consideration of any limiting factors take
place under section 1, not under section 15. It was important to keep them
analytically distinct if for no other reason than the burden of proof: “It is
for the citizen to establish that his or her Charter right has been infringed
and for the state to justify the infringement.”114 In R. v. Turpin,115 Wilson J.
twice repeated that each equality right (the right to the equal protection and
equal benefit of the law without discrimination) should be given “its full
independent content, divorced from any justificatory factors applicable
109

This is the sort of example where terms like “judicial activist” and “legislative
deference” become highly contestable concepts.
110
[1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.).
111
Id., at 1310-11.
112
Id., at 1320.
113
Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
(S.C.C.).
114
Id., at 178, per McIntyre J.
115
Supra, note 110.
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under s. 1 … ”.116 Quoting McIntyre J.’s statements above with approval,
she disapproved of attempts to read in limitations to the right to equality
under section 15 through the development of tests of whether a particular
distinction was “unreasonable”, “invidious”, “unfair” or “irrational”. In
Wilson J.’s view, such tests imported limitations into section 15 which
simply did not exist in the text.117
Justice Wilson was arguably not always wholly consistent. Her
decision in R. v. Jones118 has often puzzled commentators. In this case
she disagreed with the majority that Alberta’s requirement that all
school-aged children attend school unless they attend an approved
private school or obtain certification that efficient schooling is occurring
elsewhere violated the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of religion. She
held that the claimant had failed to demonstrate “any substantial impact”
of the impugned legislation on his religious belief.119 Justice Wilson
openly acknowledged that this sort of determination could be dealt with
under section 1 rather than in the definition of the right under section 2;
however, she asserted that the content and scope of Charter rights must
be discerned separate from any limitation imposed upon them under
section 1.120 It may be easy to conclude that in R. v. Jones Justice Wilson
failed to live up to her own standards which she so steadfastly
116

Id., at 1325.
Id., at 1328. Given such statements, it is hard to see how Wilson J. would have approved
of the Law test. See Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No.
12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.). This case has been much criticized. See, e.g., Donna Greschner,
“Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299; Sheilah Martin,
“Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299; Donna
Greschner, “The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 291; Debra M.
McAllister, “Section 15 — The Unpredictability of the Law Test” (2003-2004) 15 N.J.C.L. 3;
Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm
for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33; Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section
15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 627; Daniel Proulx, “Le concept de dignité et son usage en
contexte de discrimination: deux Chartes, deux modèles”, [2003] R. du B. (numéro spécial) 485;
Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms
Section 15” (2006) 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111; Christian Brunelle, “La dignité dans la
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne : de l’ubiquité à l’ambiguïté d’une notion
fondamentale”, in La Charte québécoise : origines, enjeux et perspectives (2006), numéro
thématique de la Revue du Barreau en marge du trentième anniversaire de l’entrée en vigueur de la
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, sous la direction de Me Alain-Robert Nadeau, 143; R.
James Fyfe, “Dignity as Theory: Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court
of Canada” (2007) 70 Sask. L. Rev. 1; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed.
2007), vol. 2, at 55-28 and 55-29; Alexandre Morin, Le droit à l’égalité au Canada (2008), at 80-82.
118
[1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (S.C.C.).
119
Id., at 315.
120
Id., at 314 quoting Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 441, at 489 (S.C.C.).
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pronounced during her years on the Court.121 However, her judgment
also demonstrates the difference between purposive interpretation and a
“large and liberal” interpretation and how that connects with her liberal
vision of personal autonomy, epitomized by her metaphor of the task of
the judiciary to map out the parameters of the invisible fences that
surround each individual over which the state will not be allowed to
trespass.122
(b) “Demonstrably Justified”: Onus and Evidence
We have seen so far how the words “demonstrably justified” were
added to section 1 through the Joint Committee process and how in
Oakes, Dickson C.J.C. referenced them to explain the evidentiary
requirements and the onus of proof for the limitations analysis.123 True to
Justice Wilson’s vigilance in upholding the Oakes framework, onus and
evidence were frequent themes in her judgments. She applied the Oakes
framework faithfully in Edwards Books, a case that followed soon after
Oakes and is often characterized in terms of a relaxation or a retreat from
the strictness of Oakes, described in more detail in the next section. She
dissented, in part because of the failure of the Crown to adduce sufficient
evidence to justify its disparate treatment of Saturday Sabbath observers.
She chastised the Crown for failing to adduce any evidence that would
establish that allowing retailers who chose on religious grounds to close
on Saturdays to remain open on Sundays would cause substantial
disruption to Sunday as the uniform day of rest. She further rejected as
speculative the assertion that allowing such a policy would motivate
other retailers to close on Saturdays in order to open on Sundays.
Expressing a sense of judicial frustration, she concluded on this point
that “[w]e simply do not know. . . . [T]he Crown failed totally to
discharge its burden under s. 1 . . .”.124
121
For a view in this respect, see David M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The
Canadian Production of Judicial Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), at 85-86, 106.
122
Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judicature 334, at 338. Justice
Wilson later incorporated these words almost verbatim into her opinion in Morgentaler. See R. v.
Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 164 (S.C.C.). See also Lavigne v. Ontario
Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (holding that freedom of
expression was not violated).
123
On the importance of onus and burden of proof under the Oakes test, see Sujit Choudhry,
“So What is The Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the
Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501.
124
Edwards Books, [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 810 (S.C.C.).
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She repeated the twin themes of onus and evidence under the Oakes
framework time and again and was demanding in their fulfillment. In
Jones, the case where Justice Wilson had found no violation of freedom
of religion, the majority found that that right had been infringed but was
saved under section 1. Justice Wilson took the government to task for
failing to adduce any evidence that the impugned government policy was
the least drastic means to accomplish the desired objective.125 Similarly,
in R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,126 Justice Wilson emphasized that the
onus rested with the government to establish the purported objective and
that it required evidence to establish it. She found no evidence to support
the allegations that dairy workers provide an essential service, the
delivery of important food products to the consumer, and that the
cessation of such delivery might threaten the health of part of the
population.127
Justice Wilson’s fidelity to the evidentiary requirements of the
Oakes framework did not wane five years after Oakes with retirement on
the horizon. Thus, in Thomson Newspapers,128 she expressed a concern
about the level of proof required in order for the government to meet its
onus. She reminded the Court that “[t]he government’s onus under
Oakes is to justify the limit on the right of the citizen on a preponderance
of probability. Dickson C.J. referred to this as ‘a very high degree of
probability’ commensurate with the occasion.”129 Similarly, in Stoffman
v. Vancouver General Hospital,130 she stated that where there was a
serious question “as to whether a pressing concern as alleged in fact
exists, it is incumbent on the party bearing the burden of proof under s. 1
to establish the pressing and substantial concern”.131 Continuing, she
opined that where the party carrying the burden of proof failed to adduce
evidence to support its assertion, the first branch of the Oakes test could
not be met.132 In the next part, we see the strictness of these aspects of
the framework at work when applied to the components of the Oakes
test.
125

Supra, note 118, at 315.
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “R.W.D.S.U.”].
127
Id., at 494.
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Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at 487.
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 125, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 700 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at 550.
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Id.
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(c) Pressing and Substantial Objective
The requirement that there be a pressing and substantial objective is
the element of the Oakes test that has attracted minimal scholarly interest
and arguably does the least analytical work. During Justice Wilson’s
tenure on the Court, the only instances where the Court found that this
requirement was not satisfied were in the pre-Oakes cases of Singh and
Big M Drug Mart.133 Not surprisingly, Justice Wilson refused to take a
pro forma approach to this requirement. She saw its purpose as ensuring
“that constitutional rights and freedoms will only be sacrificed where it
is reasonable and justifiable to do so. The concept of constitutional
entrenchment requires that rights and freedoms be curtailed only in
response to real and not illusory problems.”134 Time and again she
demanded evidence to satisfy this requirement. In R. v. Hess, she
chastised the government for failing to submit any evidence to support
its deterrence argument in defence of the statutory rape provision. Justice
Wilson asserted that “[w]here one is dealing with the potential for life
imprisonment it is not good enough, in my view, to rely on intuition and
speculation about the potential deterrent effect of an absolute liability
offence. We need concrete and persuasive evidence to support the
argument.”135 In several instances, Justice Wilson found that the
impugned government activity failed to satisfy this requirement. In
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,136 one of the cases in the Labour Trilogy,137
she would not conclude that the prevention of economic harm to a
particular sector was per se a government objective of sufficient
importance to justify abrogating the freedom protected by section 2(d).138
Justice Wilson famously questioned whether administrative
convenience and cost in particular could ever meet the pressing and
substantial requirement for limiting a Charter right. Thus in Singh, she
stated that “the guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they could

133

See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell,
2007+), at 39.8.
134
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, supra, note 130, at 550.
135
R. v. Hess, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, at 923 (S.C.C.).
136
Supra, note 126.
137
The others were Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987]
S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) and PSAC v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson agreed with Dickson C.J.C. in each of these cases that the right
to bargain collectively was protected by freedom of expression under s. 2(d) of the Charter.
138
R.W.D.S.U., supra, note 126, at 487.
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be ignored because it was administratively convenient to do so.”139 She
reiterated this position equally forcefully in one of her final cases when
she asserted: “administrative convenience is not an adequate reason for
sacrificing Charter rights and freedoms.”140 She expressed the belief that
it would always be more convenient from an administrative perspective
to treat disadvantaged groups in society “as an indistinguishable mass”
rather than to determine individual merit.141
In R. v. Lee,142 the impugned provision stripped an accused of his
right to trial by jury for failing to appear without a legitimate excuse for
so doing. The avowed purpose of the provision was to further the orderly
and efficient administration of justice, and to foster public respect for the
criminal justice system in general and the jury trial system in particular.
Justice Wilson recast this objective in more narrow terms, defining it
down to the objective of ensuring court attendance. The objective so
defined, Wilson J. examined the evidence and found that failing to attend
was not a major problem.143 Once the objective was determined in such
terms, the examination focused on questions of efficiency, the operation
of the criminal justice system and the expense incurred for jury trials.
Not surprisingly, Wilson J. then found that reducing administrative
inconvenience and reducing expense were not sufficient objectives to
override such a vital constitutional right.144
Justice Wilson demanded that the asserted problem be real and not
hypothetical. One of her final judgments, R. v. Chaulk, released a month
before she stepped down from the bench, illustrates this. I discuss it in
some detail because it represents her parting shots at a Court that had
never accepted her vision of the Charter and the role of the Court
thereunder. The issue in R. v. Chaulk was whether a provision of the
Criminal Code which presumed sanity unless an accused proved to the
contrary violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by section
139

Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 218 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson
asserted that s. 15(1) of the Charter demanded otherwise:
In discrimination claims…, if the guarantee of equality is to mean anything, it must at least
mean this: that wherever possible an attempt be made to break free of the apathy of
stereotyping and that we make a sincere effort to treat all individuals, whatever their colour,
race, sex or age, as individuals deserving of recognition on the basis of their unique talents
and abilities. Respect for the dignity of every member of society demands no less.
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, supra, note 130, at 555 (emphasis in original).
140
Id., at 554.
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Id., at 555.
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[1989] S.C.J. No. 125, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384 (S.C.C.).
143
Id., at 1419.
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11(d) of the Charter. The majority of the Court, in a decision written by
Lamer C.J.C. and concurred in by Dickson C.J.C., La Forest, Sopinka
and Cory JJ., held that the impugned provision infringed the
presumption of innocence but constituted a reasonable limit under
section 1. Justice Wilson held that the first branch of Oakes necessitated
that the government adduce evidence to demonstrate the existence of a
real social problem. The perceived social problem in this case was the
prevention of perfectly sane persons who had committed crimes from
escaping criminal liability on tenuous insanity pleas.145
Justice Wilson took issue with Lamer C.J.C.’s failure to identify any
pressing and substantial concern. In her characterization, the provision
was “a prophylactic measure designed to fend off a hypothetical social
problem that might arise absent the reverse onus”.146 In Wilson J.’s mind,
this represented “a significant departure” from the Court’s approach to
section 1 to that date.147 She asserted that theretofore the Court had
consistently evaluated challenged laws in terms of their justifiability as a
response to existing social problems. In the strongest terms, she asked:
“[D]o we wish to go down this path and justify infringements of
guaranteed Charter rights on a purely hypothetical basis? And, in
particular, do we wish to go down this path where such a fundamental
tenet of our justice system as the presumption of innocence is at stake? I
have serious reservations about adopting such a course … .”148 Less than
a month later, Justice Wilson officially retired from the Supreme Court
of Canada. As we see in the next section, similar concerns echoed
through her application of the proportionality analysis prong of Oakes.
(d) The Proportionality Analysis
It is under the proportionality analysis where the Oakes test was
most relaxed or, in Justice Wilson’s view, compromised. The
proportionality analysis of the Oakes test consists of three elements: (1)
there has to be a rational connection between the means chosen and the
pressing and substantial government objective; (2) the means must
145
R. v. Chaulk, [1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, at 1372 (S.C.C.); Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
146
Id., at 1373.
147
Id., at 1373. Note that Dickson C.J.C. (Chief Justice at the time of the hearing) joined the
decision of Lamer C.J.C. (who had become Chief Justice in the interim between the hearing and the
decision).
148
Id., at 1375.
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impair the right as little as possible; and (3) there has to be
proportionality between the effects of the measures limiting the right and
the objective and between the deleterious and salutary effects of the
measures.149 It is under the proportionality analysis — specifically its
second prong — that members of the Court developed a more flexible
approach that worried Justice Wilson and against which she consistently
protested. My comments will accordingly focus on this second prong.
For the most part, Justice Wilson refused to relax the Oakes
framework. She noted that “[i]t is only in exceptional circumstances that
the full rigour of Oakes should be ameliorated.”150 In Edwards Books
itself, which marked the beginning of the relaxation of Oakes, Wilson J.
dissented as discussed above, specifically on the issue of minimal
impairment. Again, she chastised the government for failing to bring
forward sufficient evidence and characterized the legislation as
“checkerboard” or haphazard.151 But Wilson J. was one of the three
authors of Irwin Toy, which attempted to outline the circumstances when
a relaxed version of Oakes would be appropriate. The authors of that
opinion explained:
When striking a balance between the claims of competing groups, the
choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an
assessment of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified
demands on scarce resources. Democratic institutions are meant to let
us all share in the responsibility for these difficult choices. Thus, as
courts review the results of the legislature’s deliberations, particularly
with respect to the protection of vulnerable groups, they must be
mindful of the legislature’s representative function.152

In McKinney, Wilson J. tried to explain the rationale for the more
flexible approach to section 1. She said that all of the proposed ways of
dealing with exceptions to Sunday closing laws in Edwards Books had
their faults. Respecting Irwin Toy, she explained that none of the proposed
alternatives adequately accomplished the legislature’s admittedly reasonable objective of protecting children from manipulation through
commercial media. In that context, the Court refused to second-guess the
149
See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 139 (S.C.C.), as modified
by Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 889 (S.C.C.).
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legislative wisdom of choosing to protect the interests of vulnerable
children at the limited expense of the commercial speech rights of
advertisers.153
Looking back on the relaxation of Oakes, Wilson J. saw the central
message to be drawn from these cases as being that deference was
appropriate where the legislature was forced to strike a balance between
the claims of competing groups or where the legislature was seeking to
promote or protect the interests of the disadvantaged.154 In such contexts,
Wilson J. stated, the requirement of minimal impairment would be met
where alternative means are not clearly better than the means adopted by
the government.155
It is not necessary to delve particularly deeply into these cases to
appreciate the tensions that they presented for Justice Wilson and for the
Court. For Justice Wilson, this tension manifested itself in her desire to
protect vulnerable groups and therefore to accord some modicum of
flexibility to the legislature in so doing while still maintaining fidelity to
the strictness of Oakes. She never articulated her rationale in such terms,
but perhaps the influence of section 15(2) of the Charter leeched into her
section 1 conception. This would explain her upholding of legislation
under section 1 in cases where vulnerable groups were at issue such as
Irwin Toy (children), Lavigne (union members) and Keegstra (ethnic and
religious minorities). Conversely, she would not afford deference to the
legislature in cases where she felt the group at issue was not a vulnerable
one such as McKinney (younger academics).
With the notable exception of R. v. Keegstra,156 Justice Wilson
generally refused to relax the justification standard in criminal cases.157
153

See McKinney v. University of Guelph, supra, note 150, at 401.
Id., at 401.
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Id.
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). Keegstra is a particularly troubling
case for Justice Wilson and her fidelity to the Oakes framework because it involves a criminal
prosecution, the state as “the singular antagonist” as described in Irwin Toy as a candidate for the
strictest application of the Oakes test. Dickson’s biographers explain that
Wilson wanted to uphold the anti-hate law, but she had consistently supported a relatively
strict application of the section 1 test and had always shied away from agreeing that there
could be varying degrees of scrutiny under section 1. . . She suggested concentrating on the
harmful effects of hate propaganda and avoiding reference to the core and peripheral values
of section 2(b).
Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History, 2003), at 408-409.
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See, e.g., United States v. Cotroni, [1989] S.C.J. No. 56, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (S.C.C.)
(extradition); R. v. Chaulk, supra, note 145 (presumption of innocence); R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J.
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In R. v. Chaulk, one of her last Charter cases, she expressed dismay that
Chief Justice Lamer of all people would relax the application of the
Oakes test in a criminal case. She disputed his invocation and
application of Irwin Toy, contending that it “does not stand for the
proposition that in balancing the objective of government against the
guaranteed right of the citizen under s. 1 different levels of scrutiny may
be applied depending upon the nature of the right”.158 Rather, Oakes was
the rule and flexible application the exception, whose prerequisite was
the situation where the guaranteed rights of different groups of citizens
could not be fully respected. In such cases, it was appropriate for the
Court to respect government’s attempt at fashioning a compromise
between competing groups on the basis of policy considerations.159
Justice Wilson invoked the “singular antagonist” language of Irwin Toy,
quoting at length from this portion of the judgment which she had coauthored with Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. (as he then was), both of
whom had ignored the singular antagonist rule on the facts of the case
before it in Chaulk.160
By the time she left the Court, Justice Wilson’s battle to preserve the
Oakes framework had clearly been lost. She knew it and she feared that
the Oakes test was slipping away as well. In a 1992 speech, Justice
Wilson, now retired, expressed her feeling that the Court was only
paying lip service to Oakes:
[T]here is no doubt that those who continued to cling to the strict Oakes
test (like myself) did so out of a concern that the Charter not be
emasculated, that the shift towards the much more flexible standard of
reasonableness makes it increasingly likely that governments’ immediate
objectives will take precedence over the rights and freedoms of
individuals.161

Thus, the debate over section 1 had returned full circle to the
deliberations before the Joint Committee in 1980-1981. Justice Wilson’s
statements express a sense that the Court had undone much of what had
been fought for in relation to section 1 during that time. Justice Wilson’s
position on the relationship between rights and their limits remained
relatively constant. However, the Court of which she was a member had
moved significantly from the early days of Singh and Oakes.
158
159
160
161
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4. Caveat or Cognitive Dissonance: The Relationship between
Section 1 and other Sections of the Charter
So far we have seen how Justice Wilson championed the Oakes
framework, largely emphasizing it over the text of section 1, despite
frequent invocations of the latter. However, when it came to the
relationship between section 1 and other sections of the Charter, Justice
Wilson favoured argument based on the text of section 1 rather than on
the application of the Oakes test. Where internal qualifiers existed in the
text of the right, Justice Wilson did not think that a violation could be
saved under section 1. Thus, Justice Wilson doubted whether a violation
of section 7 could ever be saved under section 1. She first expressed this
in a concurring opinion in the Motor Vehicle Reference.162 In her view, a
violation of the right to life, liberty and security of the person which
does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice could neither
be “reasonable” nor “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society”.163 According to her, the only way for government to limit the
rights under section 7 was through section 33, a circumstance that she
could only foresee in times of emergency, stating that “[t]his, however,
will be a policy decision for which the government concerned will be
politically accountable to the people.”164 She consistently maintained this
position over the course of her tenure on the Court.165
In two cases from her last term on the Court, Justice Wilson
persisted with this approach. In R. v. Hess,166 Justice Wilson and Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) clashed over the proper relationship
between section 1 and section 7, each invoking originalist justifications
for her respective position. Justice McLachlin accused Justice Wilson of
rewriting the Charter by holding that section 1 could never be applicable
to certain Charter rights. The future Chief Justice stated that “[t]he
framers of the Charter expressly subjected all the rights and freedoms
which it guarantees to the override of s. 1. It is not for the courts to alter
this by developing categories of rights which are immune from scrutiny
under s. 1.”167 In her response, Justice Wilson agreed that one could not
say that section 1 was irrelevant or inapplicable to any of the rights and
freedoms protected by the Charter. However, she returned to the Oakes
162
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framework, stating that section 1 was not devoid of values, emphasizing
the text of section 1 which stipulates “that the impugned provisions must
be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’”.168 Justice
Wilson maintained that the courts could not read “demonstrably
justified” in such a manner as “to give licence to governments to infringe
rights in any way they please. The values of a free and democratic
society must be respected. . . . Far from rewriting the Charter this
approach is entirely consistent with the Charter.”169
In this rare explicitly originalist exchange, each justice sought
support for her interpretation in the text and the drafting history of the
Charter. Justice Wilson recognized that her position on the relationship
between section 7 and section 1 had not carried the day and recast her
position in terms that it would be rare for a legislative provision that
violated the principles of fundamental justice to still be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.170 Justice Wilson had similar
concerns about the relationship between section 8 and section 1.171
Justice Wilson’s position on the relationship between section 1 and
other sections that have internal qualifiers has an internal logic to it.
Internal qualifiers like “reasonable” or “principles of fundamental
justice” lack the strictness of Oakes. On their face, they appear to set a
lower threshold for justifying an infringement of a right compared to the
strictness of the Oakes framework with its requirement that any
limitation be both “reasonable” and “demonstrably justifiable”. Under
such logic, it is hard to fathom how an infringement that was found to be
“unreasonable” could somehow be saved under section 1. With this
point, we return to the debate over the language of section 1 before the
Joint Committee in 1980-1981.
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Id., at 926.
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Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 487
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s. 1. The debate is still an important one because it is about which institution is responsible for
limiting a constitutional right in times of emergency, the courts or the legislature?
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IV. CONCLUSION: DUTY FULFILLED AND DESTINY DENIED
Justice Wilson did not lobby for a seat on the Supreme Court when
one was available.172 With the appointment of Sandra Day O’Connor to
the U.S. Supreme Court in September 1981 and the impending
mandatory retirement of Justice Martland, speculation about appointing
a woman to Canada’s highest Court grew. As one of only a few women
on Canada’s appellate courts at the time, Justice Wilson’s name was
obviously in the mix and her colleagues on Ontario’s Court of Appeal
encouraged her to accept the position if the offer came. Like some before
and since her who have been considered for appointment to Canada’s
Supreme Court, Justice Wilson had misgivings. But her biographer
describes her acceptance in the following terms: “ . . . at the end of the
day Bertha and [her husband] John both knew that if she was appointed
she had to serve. It was her duty.”173
Bertha Wilson’s conception of duty encompassed both a personal
commitment to public service as well as the institutional responsibility
of the Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter. Her vision of the role
of the courts under the Charter acknowledged and respected the changes
that Canada’s democratic representatives had made to our system of
government. In her view, the courts were given a new responsibility
under the Charter and they were duty-bound to fulfil it. She did not seem
particularly enamoured of the dialogue theory popularized after she left
the bench and which the Court endorsed. Her position was far more
direct. In her view, each branch of government had its own responsibility
under the Charter. The courts’ responsibility was to construct a fence
around the individual. The legislature, of course, has a responsibility to
ensure that its actions comply with the Charter but it also has the power
under section 33 to overrule the courts should it so choose.
The democratic element of Justice Wilson’s constitutional vision
gave voice to the many groups who participated in the process before the
Joint Committee, many of whom were very concerned about the low
threshold for limiting rights in the draft of the Charter tabled with the
Joint Committee. She would have likely rejected or dismissed the notion
that she was an originalist. But her jurisprudence draws its assertions of
normative legitimacy directly from the text and the historical context of
172
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the framing of the Charter and therefore Justice Wilson is properly
considered a moderate originalist, Canadian version. This originalism
manifested itself in its strict view of section 1 as translated by the Oakes
framework to which Justice Wilson remained faithful during her entire
tenure on the Court.
It is only in one of her final Charter judgments, R. v. Chaulk,174 that
we see a hint of Justice Wilson’s frustration with her colleagues for
abandoning even a semblance of fidelity to the Oakes test. Her positions
had remained relatively constant during her five years on the Court since
Oakes. However, her colleagues shifted and by the time she stepped
down from the Court in January 1991, Justice Wilson’s position had
become increasingly isolated.
In Singh, Justice Wilson recognized the tension inherent in the
limitations process. She stated that if too low a threshold was set, the
courts would run the risk of “emasculating the Charter” while if too high
a threshold was set, the courts would run the risk of “unjustifiably
restricting government action”.175 Most of the judges were concerned
about the latter proposition. The interpretation of certain rights such as
sections 7 and 15 became increasingly complex on the one hand and the
Oakes test was relaxed on the other. In contrast, Justice Wilson was
generally comfortable with the results caused by her fidelity to the
strictness of Oakes.
Justice Wilson’s jurisprudence reflects her originalist conception of
the Charter as a rights-bearing, potentially transformative document.
Looking back on her judgments 17 years after she left the bench causes
one to ponder whether her fidelity to the framework of Oakes would
have been sustainable throughout the 1990s as the Court entered a
different period of new challenges and divisions within the Court. I
suspect that Justice Wilson would have persisted in her fidelity to Oakes
but proved more flexible at the rights definition stage as she had
demonstrated in cases such as Jones and Hufsky.176 The joint author of
the expansive definition of freedom of expression in Irwin Toy177 might
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have joined the minority opinion in Sharp178 which expressed a
willingness to retreat from this definition in obscenity cases.
During those nine years on our nation’s highest Court, Justice
Wilson articulated a robust vision of the Charter and the relationship
between rights and their limits thereunder. She was frequently in dissent
or concurring separately, raising the question of whether her
jurisprudence has any enduring political or legal significance or should
simply be considered marginal. One view was expressed by another
great dissenter, Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who invoked the words
of Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court that a “dissent in a
court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed”.179 Dissents may give hope to some that an alternative vision
may speak to future generations and one day become a reality,180
although some think that rarely happens.181
Justice Wilson didn’t volunteer. But once conscripted to serve, Bertha
Wilson fulfilled her duty as she saw it: fidelity to the strictness of the Oakes
framework which she believed correctly encapsulated the transformational
purpose of the Charter project based upon an original understanding of the
making of the Charter. The rich historical understanding of the events of
1980-1982 which provided the foundation for Justice Wilson’s jurisprudential outlook serves as a reminder of what the Charter’s destiny might
have been and perhaps what is still possible one day.
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